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Is an Interest Deduction
for Personal Debt
a Tax Expenditure?
Alan Gunn
In the United States, generally all interest payments
are deductible. In Canada, by contrast, only interest
that is incurred for a business purpose is deductible.
In both countries, however, the deduction for
interest paid on debts connected with the acquisition
of a personal asset is commonly analyzed and
defended as if it were a tax expenditure. Thus, in the
United States the "Deductibility of Mortgage Interest
on Owner-Occupied Homes" (which constitutes
about 60 per cent of all deductions for interest paid)
and the "Deductibility of Interest on Consumer
Credit" are included in all published tax expenditure
lists. In Canada, the recent debate over whether
residential mortgage interest should be deductible,
see I Canadian Taxation (No. 3) 23-29 (1979) and I
Canadian Taxation (No. 1) 38 (1979), has been
carried on almost exclusively in tax expenditure
terms. The proposed deduction has been defended
and analyzed as a housing measure and as a measure
to stimulate the economy. In this article, Professor
Gunn argues that the deduction for interest on
personal debt is not a tax expenditure but instead is a
proper deduction in a normative income tax base.
He thus justifies a deduction for personal interest by
reference solely to tax criteria (as opposed to
expenditure criteria). His article is written from the
point of view of the United States tax position,
which at present does not distinguish between
interest income on business and personal loans. This,
Professor Gunn argues, is the theoretically correct
position.
Alan Gunn is a professor of law at Cornell University.
Tax expenditure analysis shows that most attempts to
use the tax system to further non-tax goals are inefficient,
unfair, or both.' But tax reformers have accepted too
uncritically the designation of certain features of the tax
law as tax expenditures. An obvious example is the
deduction for extraordinary medical expenses. A taxpayer
with $15,000 gross income and $10,000 in necessary2
medical expenses so obviously has less ability to pay than a
taxpayer with the same income but better health that a
deduction for medical expenses is an essential step in
measuring taxable capacity.I
Of all the common personal deductions, it is the interest
The interest deduction, judged on the
basis of tax criteria alone, serves
important functions and so is not a tax
expenditure.
1. The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
defines tax expenditures as "revenue losses attributable to pro-
visions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion,
exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide a
special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax
liability . . . ." Pub. L. 93-334, § 3(a) (3). The legislative history
shows that by special provisions, Congress meant provisions that
deviate from the normal tax structure. See Surrey & McDaniel,
"The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Reform Act of
1974," 17 B.C. Ind. Com. L. Rev. 679, 683 (1976).
S. Surrey, in Pathways to Tax Reform, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1973, explains the history and functions of the
tax expenditure budget, analyzes the effects of many tax expendi-
tures, and discusses the political problems of replacing tax expen-
ditures with direct expenditures.
2. For administrative reasons the medical expense deduction is not
limited to the costs of necessary medical procedures.
3. G. Break and J. Pechman, Federal Tax Reform. Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1975, pp. 21-22. Nevertheless, S. Surrey,
supra note 1, pp. 21-23, treats the medical expense deduction as a
tax expenditure on the ground that "most economists" would
classify it that way. Professor Surrey argues against the Break &
Pechman justification for the deduction by showing that a deduc-
tion for a given dollar amount of medical expenses benefits a 70
per cent bracket family more than a 14 per cent bracket family.
But this kind of analysis assumes the answer to the question to be
decided. If the medical expense deduction were a form of financial
assistance to taxpayers, its upside-down effect would provide legi-
timate ground for criticism. But if money spent for medical treat-
ment should be deducted in determining the tax base, the 'upside
down' point is irrelevant. To illustrate, suppose someone were to
propose that unemployed taxpayers be taxed as if they had earned
$10,000. No one would seriously support such a suggestion, since
money not earned is not income in any satisfactory practical
sense. Yet it is as true of the exclusion of non-existent earnings as
of the deduction for medical expenses that it 'benefits' high-bracket
taxpayers more than those in lower brackets. Consider also the
deduction for business expenses, which can be thought of as hav-
ing an upside-down effect if one starts by assuming a tax system
in which business expenses are not deductible.
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deduction that is most often seen as a tax expenditure.
Both scholarly and popular books denounce the deduction
as a subsidy" and an upside-down subsidy at that.5 But
this is wrong. The interest deduction, judged on the basis
of tax criteria alone, serves important functions and so is
not a tax expenditure.
Some normative model of an income tax is a necessary
starting point in designating particular exclusions,
deductions, or credits as tax expenditures, since not every
failure to tax what might be taxed is an expenditure.' No
one would describe such provisions as the deductions for
the costs of earning income or the failure to tax income at
100 per cent rather than at current rates as expenditures.
Only departures from the norm - 'special provisions' in
the sense that they are not required by tax criteria - are in
any sense equivalent to collecting taxes from everyone in
an evenhanded way and sending some of the money
collected to those whose activities are to be encouraged.
Because limiting the interest deduction to business and
investment interest would create serious administrative
problems, would bias the tax system against those with
earned incomes, and would tax people on more than the
sum of their consumption and savings, the deduction in its
present form is not a tax expenditure.
I. Administrative Convenience
One argument for allowing an interest deduction as part
of a normative tax model rests on the theoretical and
practical difficulties of distinguishing business interest
(much of which would be deductible as a business expense
in the absence of a special provision for interest) from
personal interest. This argument has been made before'
and need only be summarized here. If business interest
were deductible and personal interest were not, some
taxpayers who in the absence of taxes would have
borrowed to finance houses could try for the same non-tax
result combined with a deduction for business interest by
selling business assets, using the proceeds to buy houses,
and borrowing to continue the business. The problem here
is not merely the practical one of detecting tax avoiders. If
a taxpayer who wants a house borrows to keep from
having to take money out of a business to buy the house, is
the interest a cost of retaining the business or a cost of
buying the house? In fact, it is both, and the lack of any
way of distinguishing business from personal interest, even
in theory, supports the present system.
Past experience suggests that legislation denying a
deduction for personal interest would be enforced by
attempts to determine whether the taxpayer's motive for
borrowing was to finance personal consumption. This
technique is now used in applying section 265(2) of the
Internal Revenue Code, which denies a deduction for
interest on debt "incurred or continued to purchase or
carry" tax-exempt bonds. It is arbitrary and unfair in
application and unsound in principle. As a practical
matter, the only taxpayers who lose their interest
deductions under section 265(2) are those who lack the
resources or foresight to refrain from using their tax-
exempt bonds as collateral for their debts and those who
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do not leave a decent interval between their borrowings
and their purchases of exempt bonds.8 A similar approach
to distinguishing business or investment from personal
interest would deny interest deductions to taxpayers who
have no substantial business assets without seriously
limiting the interest that could be deducted by those who
can secure their debts with business property. But even if
taxpayer purpose could somehow be established, denying
interest deductions to those who borrow for personal as
opposed to business reasons would make no sense.
Compare a taxpayer who borrows $100,000 to buy
business assets, and who later uses his own cash to buy a
$100,000 house with another who borrows the same
amount to buy a house and later uses money not borrowed
to buy business assets. The first might be said to have
had a business motive for borrowing, and the second a
personal motive. Yet each, after buying the business assets
and the house, is in the same economic position as the
other: each has the same gross income, the same interest
payments, and the same annual consumption. A taxpay-
payer's motive for borrowing is not only hard to find, it
is not even worth looking for.9
4. S. Surrey, supra note 1, p. 36; R. Brandon, J. Rowe and T. Stan-
ton, Tax Politics. Ngw York: Pantheon, 1976, p. 55. Tax Ex-
penditures, a "compendium of summaries" of information about
tax expenditures published by the Senate Budget Committee, con-
cedes that there is no evidence that Congress "originally intended
to encourage home ownership or to subsidize the housing in-
dustry " by allowing deductions for mortgage interest and real-
property taxes, but says that home mortgage interest is at present
justified as a subsidy. Id., 94th Cong., 2d. Session. 76 (Com-
mittee on the Budget, United States Senate, 1976).
5. Subsidies taking the form of deductions or exclusions are de-
scribed as being 'upside-down' because a deduction or exclusion of
a given dollar amount produces a greater dollar benefit to a high-
bracket taxpayer than to a low-bracket taxpayer. See note 3, supra.
6. See, e.g., Surrey & Hellmuth, "The Tax Expenditure Budget -
Response to Professor Bittker," 22 Nat. Tax J. 528, 529 (1969).
7. E.g., R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax (2d ed.). Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1976, p. 151.
8. For examples of how loan proceeds are traced under § 265 (2),
see Wisconsin Cheesman, Inc. v. United States, 388 F.2d
420 (7th Cir. 1968); Rev. Proc. 72-18, 1972-1 Cum. Bull.740.
9. The assumption that tracing or purpose tests can assign interest
to particular spending overlooks the fungibility of money. See
Note, "The Deductibility of Interest Costs by a Taxpayer Holding
Tax-Exempt Obligations: A Neutral Principle of Allocation,"
61 Va. L. Rev. 211, 223 (1975).
Although tracing is wrong in principle, it may be an acceptable
practical approach to such present limits on the deductibility of
interest as § 265 (2) (interest to purchase or carry tax-exempt
bonds), § 163 (d) (limitation on deduction of investment in-
terest), and § 189 (capitalization and amortization of con-
struction period interest). Consider the denial of a deduction for
interest to purchase or carry tax-exempt bonds. The reason, if
there be any real reason, for disallowing such interest has nothing
to do with measuring the taxpayer's income on a sound normative
basis. By allowing an exemption for interest on state and local
government bonds, Congress has already decided that some
people are not to pay tax on their 'true' incomes. Denying a de-
duction for the interest cost of carrying exempt bonds seems
to be a crude way of limiting the attractiveness of those bonds
to investors, so as to reduce the drain on the federal treasury. In
effect, by enacting § 265 (2), Congress has discouraged those
without substantial assets from investing in tax-exempt bonds. It
is pointless to complain that a limit on an arbitrary tax preference
is itself arbitrary. Similar arguments can be made in favour of§ § 163 (d) and 189.
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Recognizing the problem of tracing the proceeds of
borrowing to particular expenditures, commentators have
suggested the use of allocation formulas to separate
business from personal interest. One proposal would limit
the deductibility of interest to the taxpayer's property
income.10 In effect, a taxpayer would be deemed to have
incurred investment interest only to the extent that interest
paid in a given year did not exceed the amount of the
return on investment for that year. This would be a very
crude solution, as it would allocate no interest to
investments or businesses that proved unprofitable.
Furthermore, this approach could not easily be used to
distinguish business (as opposed to investment) interest
from personal interest. At the very least, some sort of
distinction between businesses for which capital is a
"material income producing factor" and others would have
to be drawn."
... denying a deduction for personal
interest would give the tax system a
systematic bias against taxpayers whose
incomes come largely from performance
of services.
Another possible method of allocating interest between
consumption and other things would be to allocate interest
arbitrarily among the taxpayer's business assets, business
expenses, personal assets, and personal consumption.12
While this method would avoid some of the problems of
the 'interest limited to investment incomes' formula, it
would require annual valuations of all of a taxpayer's
property, and for that reason alone is probably not worth
serious consideration.
H. Earned Income and the Interest Deduction
Economists who analyze the interest deduction
sometimes defend the deduction for personal 3 interest by
comparing someone who borrows to finance current
consumption with someone else who consumes by selling
an income-producing asset.14 Compare two taxpayers,
each owning income-producing property worth $50,000
and yielding $5,000 per year income. The first sells
income-producing property and buys a $50,000 yacht; the
second borrows $50,000 at ten per cent to buy the yacht.
Economically, each taxpayer has done the same thing, and
the first has plainly reduced his taxable income by $5,000
per year. Therefore, notions of equity suggest that the tax-
payer who borrows should also have his income reduced,
a result achieved by allowing a deduction for interest.
Arguments based on 'equal treatment of equals' are
always somewhat suspect. If used without restraint they
can be used to show that nothing should be taxable, or that
everything should be. For example, one could say that
those who pay to ski should be able to deduct their costs so
as to equalize their tax treatment with that of skiing
instructors, who are not taxed on the value of the free
skiing that goes with their jobs. This argument, which does
not differ in any substantial way from that set out in the
previous paragraph, is plainly foolish; any tax system must
tolerate some people's receiving tax-free what others buy
out of after-tax income. Every form of consumption is
received tax-free by someone. An across-the-board
elimination of all inequities of this sort would eliminate
taxation. The case for the interest deduction, however, is
stronger than the case for the skiing expense deduction
because denying a deduction for personal interest would
give the tax system a systematic bias against taxpayers
whose incomes come largely from performance of
services.
It has long been accepted that, if all else is equal,
someone with a given amount of earned income has less
ability to pay than someone with an equal amount of
income from property.15 Those with earned income must
save for the day when income stops because of sickness or
retirement.' 6 Those who work for a living incur non-
deductible costs that those who do not work can avoid by
performing services for themselves.'I Therefore, a fair tax
system must avoid unnecessary features which tend
generally to tax those with earned incomes more heavily
than those with equal amounts of property income.
Denying a deduction for personal interest would
discriminate against those with earned incomes. An owner
of income-producing property can easily exchange future
income for current consumption by selling the property
and spending the proceeds, but wage earners cannot sell
their jobs. The only way a taxpayer who works for a living
can give up future earnings to get present consumption is
by borrowing. The discrimination created by denying a
deduction for the costs of skiing strikes largely at random,
10. R. Goode, supra note 7, pp. 151-52.
11. Goode, "The Economic Definition of Income," in J. Pechman
(ed.), Comprehensive Income Taxation. Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1977, pp. 1, 22-23.
12. This technique is recommended for allocating interest payments
to interest income from tax-exempt bonds in Note, supra note 9,
except that this Note does not include business expenses as an
item to which interest should be allocated.
13. As shown in the previous section, there is no practical way to
distinguish business from personal interest. In referring to de-
ductions for personal interest in this section, I shall, however,
adopt the assumption of most of the deduction's critics that
their target can somehow be identified.
14. The example that follows is a simplified version of one in
W. Vickrey, Agendafor Progressive Taxation. New York: Ronald
Press, 1947, pp. 22-23. It also appears in White, "Proper Income
Tax Treatment of Deductions for Personal Expense," 1 Tax
Revision Compendium 365 (House Comm. on Ways and Means
(1959)). Professor Vickrey opposes the interest deduction.
Professor White favoured the deduction in 1959, on the ground
that "debt, a negative asset, is a source of negative income,"
id. at 366. This is not a convincing argument, for it merely states
a conclusion. The question is, "what is income?" To say that
interest should be deducted because it is 'negative income' is to
define 'income' in a way that requires an interest deduction
without giving a reason why 'income' should be defined in that
way.
15. This idea goes back at least to John Stuart Mill. J.S. Mill,
Principles of Political Economy, Vol. 2, New York: Appleton,
1874, pp. 405-06.
16 Id.; see also N. Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax. London: Allen
& Unwin, 1955, pp. 31-32.
17. See W. Vickrey, supra note 14, pp. 49-50.
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while the burden of the discrimination that would arise if
personal interest were not deductible would fall almost
exclusively's on members of a class that should be
favoured, not disfavoured, under an income tax.
IHl. Is Interest 'Consumption'?
The widespread belief that the interest deduction is a
subsidy probably stems from a feeling that interest paid
for non-business purposes is paid for consumption, and so
should no more be deductible than any other personal
expense." But this argument is not persuasive. The mere
fact that a taxpayer incurs an expense in order to enable
him to consume (or to consume earlier rather than later)
cannot mean that that expense is itself consumption.
Suppose a taxpayer goes into business and spends a
large sum on advertising and other business expenses in
order to make money which he plans, eventually, to
consume. The business expenses are incurred for con-
sumption in a cause-and-effect sense, since they are in-
curred only because of the taxpayer's desire to consume,
but no one would seriously argue that those expenses are
themselves consumption. Indeed, interest can be viewed as
at least analogous to business expenses in the sense that
both interest on personal debt and business expenses are
incurred to enable the taxpayer to get money to be used to
purchase personal satisfactions. 20 Again, an 'equal
treatment of equals' analysis suggests that if business ex-
penses are deductible interest should be deductible as
well.
The 'interest is consumption' idea seems to be based on
the obvious point that someone who borrows to consume
something he otherwise would have had to wait for must
have expected 'satisfaction' from consuming earlier
rather than later equal to that which would have been
received by spending the money used to pay interest on
something else. That is, a taxpayer who pays $200 in
interest to take a vacation trip this year rather than next
must have anticipated at least as much enjoyment from
taking the trip early as he would have received by
spending the $200 on visits to nightclubs. There are at least
two things wrong with this argument. First, it proves far
too much; it proves, for example, that business expenses
should not be deductible, since we could say that a
taxpayer who spent $200 on business expenses instead of
on riotous living must have expected as much satisfaction
from the business spending as would have been received
from consuming out of the $200.21 Second, if the benefits
of consuming now rather than later should be regarded as
consumption, they should be regarded as consumption
across the board, not just in the case of those taxpayers
who have to pay interest to consume early.22 Taxpayers do
not pay additional taxes because they earn the money they
spend on consumption early enough to pay for that
consumption without borrowing. Suppose a taxpayer
wants to take a $1,000 vacation trip in 1980 so badly
that he will pay $1,100 for the trip. If he happens to
earn $1,000 in 1980 he is viewed as having earned and
consumed $1,000 in that year. If his earnings were
delayed until 1981, so that taking the trip in 1980
required borrowing $1,000 at an interest cost of $100,
the 'interest is consumption' theory would say that his
consumption was $1,100. Interest incurred to pay for
consumption is as much a cost of earning later as of
consuming earlier. 23
IV. Interest, Rent, and Imputed Income
Most discussions of the interest deduction focus on
home mortgage interest. Since what one buys with mort-
gage interest is the right to occupy a house earlier, rather
than later, such interest resembles rent, and so we see com-
plaints that allowing a deduction for mortgage interest but
not for rent discriminates against renters. Even if this is
true, discrimination against renters is a far less serious
problem, in terms of fairness, 2 4 than the discrimination
18. A few people with property incomes would be disadvantaged
by repealing the interest deduction. For example, some trust
beneficiaries have income rights that cannot be assigned. But
the great majority of those who cannot sell the source of their
incomes are wage earners.
19. This seems to be the position of White, supra note 14.
20. Consumer interest is paid to enable the consumer to buy now,
rather than later, and so may seem to differ from a business ex-
pense because the latter is ordinarily incurred to enable the tax-
payer to make a profit. But the expenses of a business run with a
view to a quick, small profit are just as deductible as those of a
business that aims at a larger, but later, profit. Since anyone
with a choice of earning patterns will consider his needs for
current consumption in making the choice, it is safe to conclude
that some business expenses are, like personal interest, incurred
to enable the taxpayer to consume earlier rather than later.
21. Cf. Andrews, "A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax," 87 Harv. L. Rev. 113, 1167 n. 119 (1974).
22. See Andrews, "Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax,"
- 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 376 n. 116. (1973). To take the supposed
time value of consumption into account fully would require
abandoning income as the tax base and taxing consumption
instead. For present purposes, it may suffice to say that the choice
of income rather than consumption as the tax base reflects a
decision that there is no time value of consumption, or at least
none that should count in determining tax liability. I have
addressed the time value of consumption point on the merits in
Gunn, "The Case for an Income Tax," 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 370,
374-78 (1979), and will not repeat the argument here.
23. Under the 'Haig-Simons' definition, income is the sum of a tax-
payer's consumption and additions to savings in a given period.
H. Simons, Personal Income Taxation. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1938, p.50. Since interest is not consumption,
its deduction in computing Haig-Simons income is essential.
Whether the Haig-Simons definition provides a useful starting
point for creating a tax system is debatable. Haig-Simons income
is at the very least, however, one widely-used normative income
model, and since this is so, it follows that a deduction required
by the Haig-Simons model is not a tax expenditure. See Blum,
Book Review, 1 J. Corp. Tax. 486 (1975) (items that "can be
and often are justified to some degree on grounds that relate to
the tax system" are not tax expenditures in the same sense as
provisions like those allowing rapid amortization of pollution-
control equipment, which are plainly subsidies.)
24. In terms of efficiency or economic neutrality a case might be
made for discriminating against those with earned income rather
than against renters. Neutrality arguments assume that a 'good'
tax is one that gives taxpayers little inducement to change their
behaviour from what it would be in a world with no taxes. The
interest deduction may well have caused more resources to
flow toward housing than would have been the case if there were
no tax; but it almost surely has not induced many people to live
on earnings from property rather than on wages.
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against those with earned incomes that would attend deny-
ing a deduction for mortgage interest. For most people at
any given income level the choice between buying and
renting is much more likely to be voluntary than the choice
between owning income-producing property and working
for a living. A line must be drawn somewhere, either be-
tween renters and buyers or between those with property
and those with none. Drawing it between renters and
buyers avoids a systematic bias contrary to the ability-to-
pay concept that makes income a fair tax base.
It is worth noting that the interest problem would not be
fully solved by taxing imputed income. To be sure, if
imputed income from homeownership were taxed, interest
on a home mortgage loan would be deductible as a cost of
earning income. But not all personal interest is incurred to
buy houses. Taxpayers who borrow to pay for immediate
consumption items like vacation trips surely have no im-
puted income from their spending (or at least none that
could, even in principle, be measured and taxed). In any
event, the likelihood that we will ever tax income from
homeownership is so remote that it seems wise to take its
nontaxability as given.
Nor can denying a deduction for interest be justified as a
technique for offsetting the benefits taxpayers receive from
the exclusion of imputed rents from income. 25 Whether
exclusion of imputed rents does benefit anyone is
doubtful. Under current (admittedly unrealistic) depreci-
ation practices, investments in residential real estate are tax
shelters, not sources of added tax liability. 26 The problem
would be even more severe if imputed rent from a tax-
payer's own house were taxed, since taxpayer-home-
owners would have little incentive to keep maintenance
and repair expenses, which would be deductible as costs of
earning income if imputed rents were taxable, within
reasonable limits.27 And even if the depreciation and
maintenance problems were solved, there is no good
reason to believe that any increase in a taxpayer's in-
come from denying him an interest deduction would
even approximate the increase (if any) in his income that
would occur if imputed rent were taxed and interest, main-
tenance, and depreciation were deductible. The taxpayer
with no mortgage, for example, would not be affected at
all by repeal of the deduction for mortgage interest. Thus,
even if mortgage interest payments, for taxpayers with
mortgages, were on the average equal to those taxpayers'
net imputed rents, attempts to tax those net imputed rents
indirectly by denying mortgage interest deductions would
not reach the wealthy.28
Conclusion
To the extent that the tax expenditure budget is regarded
as a list of subsidies that should be evaluated by looking to
non-tax considerations, 29 the interest deduction should be
removed from the list. Whatever increase in fairness repeal
of the deduction for personal interest would achieve by
equalizing homeowners and renters would be more than
outweighed by the practical problems of distinguishing
personal from business and investment interest and by the
50
introduction into the tax system of a systematic bias
against those with earned income.
Inclusion of interest and other questionable items in the
Tax Expenditure Budget exaggerates the extent to which
Congress uses the tax code to subsidize favoured activity,
fosters popular dissatisfaction with the tax system, 0
encourages unrealistic hopes for the savings to be achieved
by tax reform," and discredits the tax expenditure con-
cept itself.12
25. This 'second best' argument for denying deductions for interest
is often advanced, though in view of the serious practical
problems of distinguishing personal from other interest this
justification for denying the deduction is weak. Ordinarily,
'second best' arguments are used to justify crude measures in lieu
of theoretically better but practically inferior proposals. In the
case of the interest deduction and the exclusion of imputed in-
come, however, the 'second best' approach of denying deductions
for mortgage interest seems to raise as many practical problems
as the alternative of imputing income to homeowners on the
basis of their houses' values as estimated for local property
taxes or on a 'purchase price plus inflationary increase' basis.
26. The argument for taxing homeowners on the rental value of their
houses is that the income tax should not favour the homeowner
over someone who owns a house, rents it to a tenant, and uses
the proceeds to pay rent. If we accept the present depreciation
practices as a starting point, the argument for taxing homeowners
on imputed rents actually supports giving homeowners a
deduction for what might be called an 'imputed tax shelter.'
27. I am indebted to Cruz Saavedra, Cornell Law School, class of
1979, for this observation. C. Kahn, in Personal Deductions in the
Federal Income Tax, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1960, p. 119, reports that Wisconsin's attempt to tax imputed
rent failed because of "a widespread practice of overstating
expenses."
28. The argument that denying interest deductions might, on the
average, have somewhat the same effect as taxing imputed in-
come from ownership of a house is not persuasive. People do
not pay taxes 'on the average.' Section 72, which determines
income from annuities by looking to average life-expectancies,
rather than the individual taxpayer's experience, illustrates the
deficiencies of tax rules which work out only on an overall basis:
Under § 72 hardly any taxpayer will pay the right amount of
tax, since nearly everyone dies earlier or later than the actuarial
tables would predict.
29. As the concept's proponents universally argue; see note 1,
supra. In dealing with some problems it may be acceptable to
call the interest deduction a subsidy. It is certainly the case that,
even though the deduction performs an important tax function
and should not be repealed, it acts like a subsidy in encouraging
people to spend for housing instead of other things. Therefore,
in evaluating proposals to enact or continue 'real' subsidies for
housing, such as the use of tax-exempt bonds to provide low-
interest mortgage money, Congress should bear in mind that
housing is already encouraged by the deductibility of mortgage
interest. Most tax expenditure theorists have treated tax ex-
penditures as an all-or-nothing concept, under which a given
tax provision either is, or is not, a subsidy. As the example of the
interest deduction shows, this approach is too simple.
30. For an example of such dissatisfaction in an extreme form,
see R. Brandon, J. Rowe & T. Stanton, supra note 4.
31. See Bittker, "Income Tax 'Loopholes' and Political Rhetoric,"
71 Mich. L. Rev. 1099 (1973).
32. Much of the force of Professor Bittker's attacks on the con-
cept of the comprehensive tax base (e.g., Bittker, "A 'Compre-
hensive Tax Base' as a Goal of Income Tax Reform," 80Harv. L. Rev. 925 (1967)) derives from the careless labeling of
tax provisions as subsidies by his opponents.
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